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Abstract
In this work, we develop a reinforcement learning protocol for a multiagent coor-
dination task in a discrete state and action space: an iterated prisoner’s dilemma
game extended into a team based, winner-take all tournament, which forces the
agents to collude in order to maximize their reward. By disallowing extra com-
munication channels, the agents are forced to embed their coordination strategy
into their actions in the prisoner’s dilemma game.
We develop a representation of the iterated prisoner’s dilemma that makes it
amenable to Q-learning. We find that the reinforcement learning strategy is able
to consistently train agents that can win the winner take all iterated prisoner’s
dilemma tournament.
By using a game with discrete state and action space, we are able to better ana-
lyze and understand both the dynamics and the communication protocols that are
established between the agents. We find that the agents adapt a number of in-
teresting behaviors, such as the formation of benevolent dictators, that minimize
inequality of scores. We also find that the agents settle on a remarkably consistent
symbology in their actions, such that agents from independent trials are able to
collude with each other without further training.
1 Motivation
In domains such as biology, economics, and politics, winner-take-all dynamics emerge when a sin-
gle entity can secure enough resources in the short run to ultimately seize control of all available
resources. In simple microbial communities, slight growth advantages accumulate over time to allow
the fittest to take over. In economics, economies of scale lead to cumulative advantage and winner-
take-all markets [1]. In politics, first-past-the-post voting systems concentrate political power in
a single winner, regardless of their margin of victory. Unsurprisingly, these dynamics can lead to
intense competition as entities strive to win both by improving themselves and by sabotaging their
competitors.
At the same time, competition is often mitigated by the capacity of any one individual to gain control
of enough resources to completely out-compete their opponents. Thus, individuals have an incentive
to band together to ensure that one of their own is the ultimate victor, with the spoils distributed
among the team members. However, in order for such unions to form, the agents must coordinate
with each other to establish a strategy.
Coordinating the strategy can be difficult since interacting agents interacting do not have full vis-
ibility into each other’s internal state. Thus, agents look for visible signals that are understood to
correlate with coordinating behavior [2]. Furthermore, in some environments, exogenous factors,
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such as regulators prohibit explicitly coordination, so agents wishing to collude must do so implic-
itly [3].
In this work, we will focus on how agents can embed a primitive “language” to establish coordination
into their action space. We use language here in the sense of Lewis, as signals that have become
coupled to the signified solely based on agreed upon convention [4]. Furthermore, we show that the
signifiers in the language that emerges becomes coupled with the signified based on the environment,
and obeys the properties of a rational exchange [5], and thus agents trained independently can still
establish coordination.
To study dynamics in such complex systems, researchers rely on simplified models of dynamics.
The iterated prisoner’s dilemma (IPD) is a well-studied model for understanding the emergence of
cooperation in biology and economics [6] and is a natural starting point for our study of learning
implicit communication. Briefly, the standard prisoner’s dilemma game presents two players with
a choice: to cooperate or defect with their opponent. The total mutual benefit is maximized when
both cooperate even though each individual has an incentive to defect.
The iterated prisoner’s dilemma is an extension of the one-shot prisoner’s dilemma, where players
play a series of bouts against one another. Unlike the one-shot case, the optimal strategy here is not
so clear. Good strategies often allow for mutual cooperation and punishment of defection [7]. How-
ever, the optimal strategy depends on the nature of the tournament. One particularly successful class
of strategies drives players to identify other players following an identical strategy of themselves
and then collude with each other. These strategies are typically carefully designed to have a specific
handshake [8].
Rather than designing such communication strategies into our agents, we are interested in using
reinforcement learning to discover such strategies, analyze the learning process to understand how
such strategies could evolve, and explore the dynamics by modulating the structure of the game
and the opponents to understand how different environments and reward structures permit different
stable strategies. To explore this, we will use a winner-take-all round-robin, iterated prisoner’s
dilemma tournament. We impose a winner-take-all tournament structure, in which the winner of the
tournament receives the cumulative payoff from all of the agents in order to entice collusion between
agents. We further employ a round-robin tournament structure so that each agent faces every other
agent exactly ounce in the tournament.
Thus we are interested in understanding how such collusion relationships could develop via implicit
communication. That is, communication that occurs through the actions that are directly tied to
the payoffs themselves, rather than over a separate communication channel. The iterated prisoner’s
dilemma is a useful model for studying such questions due to the emergent dynamics that can arise
from simple rules.
1.1 Related Work
Previous work in developing learning algorithms for the iterated prisoner’s dilemma included using
neural networks to learn about the opponent within tournaments [9], learning strategies for evolu-
tionary algorithms [10], or training generic agents that can learn many games [11]. Our work differs
from these in two key regards. First, we are attempting to establish a tournament policy, rather than a
per game policy. Thus what other papers refer to as within tournament adaptive learning, we would
formulate as a single policy in our analysis. Second, previous work develops strategies that seek to
achieve the highest payout for an individual agent in a tournament [12, 13], whereas our focus on
winner takes all tournaments finds an optimal strategy that maximizes the payouts of all agents in
the tournament, conditioned on the focal agent winning the tournament.
Other work has explored multi-agent cooperation and the evolution of communication protocols
that allow agents to share information, in terms of centralized and localized learning using Deep
Q Learning. In the centralized approach, agents are able to leverage communication protocols to
backpropagate error derivatives [14, 15]. Other approaches that have investigated the case of narrow
communication channels assumed cooperation and used multiagent coordination to learn policies
that allow the agents to work together to maximize the shared objective function [16, 17].
Work using continuous time and space social games found that cooperation emerges in the pres-
ence of abundant resources, but reduces if there is a shortage of global resources, leading to con-
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flict [18, 19], and that changing incentive structures in the game can promote or inhibit coopera-
tion [20].The nature of the continuous time and space facilitates the development of gradient-based
learning algorithms. However, the continuous state spaces make it difficult to understand the actual
communication strategies learned by the agents.
2 Winner-Take-All Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma
Table 1: Payoff matrix for a single
round of Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma
A/B Collude Defect
Collude 3/3 5/0
Defect 0/5 1/1
In the one-shot prisoner’s dilemma, the payoff matrix is
such that each agent has an incentive to defect, yet mutual
cooperation leads to the highest payoff matrix. We use the
same payoff matrix as in Axelrod’s original tournament,
which is given in Table 1 [7].
In the iterated prisoner’s dilemma, two agents compete
over several of bouts, with the final payoff being the sum
of the payoffs over the rounds. In the individual-based
tournament, each agent plays a round-robin tournament
against every other agent exactly once, and the order of the matches is randomized prior to the start
of the tournament. Players are able to see their opponent’s past actions, but cannot observe any
matches in the tournament that they do not participate in. They cannot observe the identity of their
opponents, and no side channels of communication are allowed.
The tournament is set up in a winner-take-all fashion, such that at the end of the tournament, the
agent with the highest score receives a reward as the cumulative payout from all players in all rounds
of the tournament, while the losers receive a reward of 0. However, tournaments may also be set up
to with teams that divide the reward evenly in side payments after the tournament, thus encouraging
collusion.
3 MDP formulation of Prisoner’s Dilemma
In this section we develop the round-robin, iterated prisoner’s dilemma as a Markov decision
process. Previous work on developing machine learning algorithms to find policies for iterated
prisoner’s dilemma has used feature engineering to condense the state space available to the
agents [13, 21]. This work has empirically yielded quite effective policies, but such restrictions
on the state space visible to the agents unacceptably restricts the available communication policy.
3.1 One Off Prisoner’s Dilemma
In the case of the one off prisoner’s dilemma, a policy is either “Cooperate” or “Defect”. No matter
what the opponents policy, “Defect” has a higher payoff.
In the one off prisoner’s dilemma, there is a single starting state, s0, and the action space A :=
{C,D}.
3.2 Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma
In the iterated prisoner’s dilemma, the action space remains the same, however the state space in-
creases. We can define the state as the actions taken in the bouts up to the current round. Each bout,
B of the prisoner’s dilemma has one of four outcomes, and the state space, S is made up of all the
possible bouts, up to the tournament length, n.
B ∈ {(C,C), (C,D), (D,C), (D,D)} , S = ∪0≤i≤nBi
Thus a policy function pi is a surjective map from states to actions: pi : S → A, and Π is the set of
all such maps. We define rs, as the cumulative reward earned by the agent in state s as the sum of
the reward for each bout in s ∈ S. Furthermore, for convenience we define a restricted state space
of the states possible after bout k of the tournament to be Sk = Bk
Then also define P (sk|pi1, pi2) as the probability of arriving at sk given the opponent is using policy
pi2 and we are using policy pi1, and we can then find P (pi2|sk, pi1) using Bayes rule.
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We define the value of the policy, pi, from the initial state s0, against an agent playing policy pi′ to
be
V pi(s0, pi
′) = Es∈Sn [rs] =
∑
sn∈Sn
rsnP (sn|pi, pi′) (1)
Thus we can define the optimal policy, pi∗i , when faced against opponent pii, to be pi
∗
i =
argmaxpi∈Π V
pi(s0, pi
′).
3.3 IPD: Unknown Opponent
In the iterated prisoner’s dilemma tournament, the agent must find an optimal policy even though it
does not know the policy of it’s opponent.
We could think about a naı¨ve strategy to do this would be to look at all of the optimal strategies
against our prospective opponents, and pick the one that is the best overall, given the probability of
encountering the opponent, P (pi′). That is, Π′ = {pi ∈ Π | pi = pi∗i for some i} and
pi∗ = argmax
pi∈Π′
E[V pi(sk, pi′)] = argmax
pi∈Π′
∑
pi′
V pi(s0, pi
′)P (pi′)
However, this will not necessarily be the best strategy, since the optimal strategy to play against all
opponents may be some compromise between the best strategy against each of them.
Furthermore, as the agent plays against opponents, it can make guesses about their policy. The
optimal policy must also balance competing factors of playing moves that refine knowledge of the
current opponent, avoid driving the opponent to an unfavorable state during exploration, and opti-
mize reward given the knowledge of the opponent.
This can be seen more clearly by optimizing over the entire policy space (pi∗ =
argmaxpi∈Π E[V pi(s0, pi′)]) and breaking the policy into two components pi∗k and pi
∗sk
n−k, those played
for the first k moves, and those for the rest of the tournament, given state sk after k moves.
Any policy can be broken down in this way, since information at previous states is always available
at subsequent states, and the opponent’s decisions has no direct knowledge of our own policy, only
the mutually observable states.
First, we approach the policy for the second set of moves given sk:
pi∗skn−k = argmax
pin−k
Epi′ [V pin−k(sk, pi′n−k)|sk] = argmax
pin−k
∑
pi′n−k
V pin−k(sk, pi
′
n−k)P (pi
′
n−k|sk) (2)
The optimal first set of moves has policy that balances receiving the optimal reward and establishing
the best sk for future rewards.
pi∗k = argmax
pik
Epi′
[
Esk
[
rsk + V
pi
∗sk
n−k(sk, , pi
′
n−k)
]]
(3)
= argmax
pik
(∑
pi′
∑
sk
rskP (sk|pik, pi′k)P (pi′) +
∑
pi′
V pi
∗sk
n−k(sk, pi
′
n−k)P (pi
′|sk)
)
(4)
That is, the optimal policy can be thought of as balancing exploring by tightening the posterior
distribution of P (pi′|sk, pi), maximizing the reward rsk while doing so, and maintaining the state in
favorable region of the opponent’s policy by maximizing V (sk, pi′).
3.4 Tournament Play
We can extend the analysis from before to apply to tournament play as well. In the winner-take-all
tournament, only the player with the highest score receives any payout, and the payout received is
the sum of all other players accumulated score. Formally, if the opponents are K = pi1, pi2, ...piN ,
then pi∗ maximizes the payoff as defined by the reward structure:
pi∗ = argmax
pi
∑
i
f(pi, pii)I[f(pi, pii) > f(pii, pi)∀pii ∈ K] (5)
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3.5 Team Play
This is similar to tournament play, but in this case we maximize two strategies
pi∗, pi∗
′
= argmax
pi,pi′
∑
i
f(pi, pii)I[f(pi, pii) > f(pii, pi)∀pii ∈ K] (6)
This is similar to the single agent tournament play in the previous section, but the subtle change of
allowing for the simultaneous optimization of two policies introduces much more complex dynamics
into the game.
3.6 Learning policies using Q-Learning
To find the optimal policy, we need a way to explore the O(2n) policy space. We can do this using
Q-learning, which learns a value function for the value of each action when taken at a given state:
{S,A} → R.
This function can be learned using an iterative approach to learn Qˆ, our approximation of Q, which
corresponds with the optimal policy for the second set of moves (Eqn 2.)
Qˆ(s, a) ≈ Q(s, a) = max
pi
Epi′
[
E′a [V pi(s||{a, a′}, pi′) | pi′ ] | s
]
(7)
We will learn this using an iterative approach, in which after each training episode, we update our Q
function using the following update rule.
Q(i)(s, a) = (1− α)Q(i−1)(s, a) + α
(
R(s, a) + γmax
a′
Q(i−1)(s′, a′)
)
(8)
The reward function R(s, a), maps state-action pairs to the the real numbers, under the constraint
that the sum of rewards for a given path through the tournament would create a reward as described in
the winner-take-all dynamics in 3.4. That is ifL is a set of state-action pairs from an IPD tournament,
∑
s,a∈L
R(s, a) =

∑
pi1
∑
pi2 6=pi
V pi1(s0, pi2) if
∑
pi′ 6=pi
V pi(sk, pi
′) >
∑
p˜i 6=pi′
V pi(s0, pi
′)∀pi′ 6= pi
0 otherwise
(9)
Given this constraint, we will note that the reward function does not affect the optimal policy, how-
ever it could have an impact on the learning algorithm, and how well it can find the optimal policy.
We will formulate this reward function as state-by-state payoffs for each bout of the iterated pris-
oner’s dilemma, and then if the opponent loses the tournament it forfeits its accumulated payoff to
the winner, and if it wins it acquires the opponents accumulated payoff in the final round.
The policy that chosen at state a is argmaxαQ(s, a) with probability 1 −  and randomly selected
from A with probability .
Name Description
Tit-for-tat Mirror the opponent’s last action
Tit-for-
two-tats
If the opponent defected in the past
two bouts, defect, else cooperate
Grudge Cooperate until opponent defects,
then defect forever
Defector Defect
Cooperater Cooperate
Table 2: Strategies in tournament against which
our agents learn.
We set , α proportional to the training episode
raised to the 34 , where the learning rate has a
minimum value of 0.03. To aid in convergence
of the Q-table approximation, we employ ex-
perience replay, using the state-action-reward
values 5 times for each training episode. For
the collusion case we alternate the training of
each agent, one agent updates it’s parameters
for 300 consecutive episodes, and then they re-
main fixed while the other agent updates for
300 episodes. When an agent has fixed its pa-
rameters it still employs an -greedy strategy
where  is the lesser of the  according to the
learning schedule and 0.01.
3.7 Implementation
In order to simulate our Iterated Prisoner’s
Dilemma game, and compare against standard competitive agents, we used the Axelrod Python
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Figure 1: A sample of five teams of agents train-
ing over 20,000 episodes to play winner-take-all
IPD. Due to the optimization of opponents strate-
gies in winner-take-all dynamics, the agent often
switches between winning and losing solutions
over training.
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Figure 2: The median performance of the
last 10% of training episodes in the collud-
ing tournament. For tournaments of length
longer than 5, the reinforcement learning
algorithm is able to reliably find winning
strategies, with minimal degradation as tour-
nament length increases.
library [22]. This provides many standard agents for us to use as competitors, so we are able to com-
pare against state-of-the-art results and published tournaments. Given a set of agents, the library
runs the tournament and outputs the overall scores of each agents and the moves they made, onto
which we impose the winner-take-all dynamic and then compute rewards and updates as dictated
by our learning methods. In our experiments we use a tournament of five opponents described in
table 2.
4 Results
In training these agents, the Q-learning algorithm performs a near-exhaustive search of the state-
space, where the master and slave agent estimates Q-values for 92% and 96% of possible states,
respectively. Furthermore, given the array of opponents we use, the agents can learn a rather trivial,
non-colluding strategy of defecting on the last round. To force more interesting strategies, we impose
a 3 point per opponent handicap on the the learning agents, which offsets their advantage from being
able to learn the tournament length.
The agents can learn a winning strategy for the 6-bout tournament within the first 500 training
episodes, and this strategy is refined over the remainder of the training period. Without the new
learner, the winner of the tournament would be tit-for-tat. As a result, the learner starts with a hostile
strategy that cooperates with tit-for-tat just enough to win, but not so much that tit-for-tat could win.
Over time, it learns a less aggressive strategy that maximizes the total reward by cooperating with
the tit-for-tat strategy and capitulating occasionally to the defector (Fig. 3).
The reward function places the optimal strategy near a critical tipping point which exacerbates the
non-stationarity; once a team has the highest score in the tournament, it further improves its score
by allowing other agents to perform better and minimizing the difference between its score and its
competitors. Thus slight instabilities in the learned policy can cause the team to go from winning
to losing (Fig. 1). However, despite this, the agents are able to learn colluding strategies for tourna-
ments of length greater than 5, with little degradation in performance as tournament length increases,
as shown in Fig. 2.
We can analyze these learned strategies to better understand a coordination protocol that the agents
have learned. An example of such a winning strategy is shown in Fig. 5. We see that the agents on
6
Figure 3: A single agent learns an optimal strategy of 20,000 training episode. Shown here is the
strategy at episodes 500, 10,000 and 20,000. Each cell in the table represents a match-up between
the two opponents, where columns are bouts of the tournament and red indicates defection and green
indicates cooperation. The agent first learns a hostile strategy that allows it to win, and then refines
that strategy by permitting other agents to do better and maximize the total reward.
the team have developed very different strategies, in which one primarily defects and becomes the
winner, and the other primarily cooperates, transferring reward to its partner, enabling the partner
to win, while still defecting on non-team members enough to prevent them from winning, recapitu-
lating stylized facts of real-world implicit collusion [23]. Furthermore, we see that the master agent
plays the same strategy against the servant as it does against the Tit-for-2-Tats, whereas the servant
always cooperates when playing the master, but not with any other agent.
These interactions can be interpreted within the framework of Horn’s Q and R communication prin-
ciples [5]. That is the Q principle, of make your contribution sufficient, and say as much as you
can given R, and the R principle, make your contribution necessary and say no more than you must
given Q. Thus we can see that when the master plays the first move, it completely communicates
its identity in the first two moves, which is a sufficient communication, and necessary to avoid the
servant defecting. However the servant, by not defecting after being defected on in the first bout,
has communicated that it is either the Servant, Tit-for-2-Tats or Cooperator, which is a sufficient
communication for the remainder of the strategy.
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Figure 4: Agents trained independently in
the same environment are able to collude
with each other.
Despite the apparent instability within the training
regime, we see that the learned coordination proto-
cols are remarkably consistent and non-arbitrary. In
establishing a coordination protocol, it is sometimes
the case that the specifics of the signal are unimportant,
but rather, that each agent has associated that particu-
lar signal with a signified behavior. In which case, we
would expect it to be unlikely for agents from differ-
ent training regimes to communicate with each other.
However, we find that out of 20 independent training
regimes 85% of regimes had at least one subset of mas-
ter/servant pair that establish coordination strategies
that win the tournament, and of those, 58% of training
regime pairs had both master/servant that could win
the tournament. Surprisingly, two regimes had 3 pairs
of strategies, suggesting that at least agent was able to
switch between the master and servant role, depending
on the context (Fig: 4).
All winning learned strategies share a characteristic
pattern: the first two bouts are used as a role identi-
fication sequence followed by a subsequent division of
labor into a master/servant relationship. The identifi-
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Figure 5: The learned strategy for teams of colluding agents. Cooperate is in green and defect
in red. Both teams learn an identification sequence and subsequently divide labor into master and
servant roles, where the servant colludes despite the master’s defection so that the master can win
the tournament and share the cumulative reward.
cation sequence is Master/Servant D/C then C/C or D. This signature response is unique to the
master, and the servant then cooperates regardless, while the master defects. In this example, the
master agent then proceeds to continuously defect against tit-for-tat, and play an optimal strategy
against tit-for-2-tats. Although the agents could identify each other if the identification protocol was
reversed, in all of the learned replicates, the identification protocol was tied with the roles, since the
wrong action by either party against a non-colluder would have an adverse impact on subsequent
division of labor.
5 Conclusion
By using the discrete state and action space of the iterated prisoner’s dilemma, we can explore how
strategies adapt in winner-take-all environments. In the case of a single agent, we see that an agent
first learns an aggressive approach to ensure that it outperforms other agents, but over the training
period cooperates more to maximize the total overall reward.
The team of agents in this study are able to establish a strategy to communicate with each other to
establish identity even when no explicit channel is present, and no information is shared before play.
Simply by having a shared reward, through repeated play an identity recognition protocol and divi-
sion of labor between the two agents emerge. Furthermore, this division of labor is consistent across
runs, and does not result in overfitting as has been observed in some multi-agent reinforcement
learning environments [24].
Simply, by being trained in the same environment, agents are, more often than not, able to recognize
other agents with a complementary coordination protocol. The consistency of the learned policy
to adapt to the environment suggests the possibility for similar regularities may arise in implicit
coordination in other domains.
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